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PART I: INTRODUCTION
“Viability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in
fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortion.”1 This was the United States Supreme Court’s essential holding in the 1973 landmark case of Roe v. Wade.2 In 1992 and
again in 2007 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that essential holding in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart.3 However, to
date, thirteen states have enacted statutes that appear to challenge this
decade-old ruling on its face.4 Starting in 2010 with Nebraska,5 states
began enacting laws banning abortions beginning at twenty weeks gestational age, a point in time that precedes fetal viability.6 States have

1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 835–36 (1992).
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (setting out the trimester framework
under which the State can only prohibit nontherapeutic abortions after a fetus is viable),
holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
3. Casey, 505 U.S. at 835–36; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007).
4. See ALA. CODE § 26-23B-5 (West, Westlaw through Act 2014-191 of the 2014
Regular Session); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2159 (West, Westlaw through the First Regular
and First Special Session of the Fifty-first Legislature (2013)) (held unconstitutional by
Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 905 (U.S. 2014));
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1405 (West, Westlaw through end of 2013 Regular and First Ex.
Session, including changes made by Ark. Code Rev. Comm. received through 1/1/2014, and
emerg. eff. acts from 2014 Fiscal Sess.: 210); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141 (West, Westlaw
through Act 351 of the 2014 Regular Session); IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-505 (West, Westlaw
through emergency effective legislation of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature enacted as of March 26, 2014) (held unconstitutional by McCormack v.
Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Idaho 2013)); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1 (West,
Westlaw through P.L.29 of the Second Regular Session of the 118th General Assembly (2014)
with effective dates through March 13, 2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6724 (West, Westlaw
through 2013 regular and special session) (banning abortions beginning at twenty-two weeks
gestational age); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.30.1 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Regular Session); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3,106 (West, Westlaw through End of 2013 Regular
Session); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-45.1 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Regular Session of the General Assembly); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-05.3 (West, Westlaw
through the 2013 Regular Session of the 63rd Legislative Assembly); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 1-745.5 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 23 (End) of the First Extraordinary Session of
the 54th Legislature (2013)); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.044 (West, Westlaw
through end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the 83rd Legislature).
5. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the Constitution, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 235, 235 (2011).
6. ALA. CODE § 26-23B-5 (West, Westlaw through Act 2014-191 of the 2014 Regular Session); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2159 (West, Westlaw through the First Regular and
First Special Session of the Fifty-first Legislature (2013) (held unconstitutional by Isaacson,

2014]

TWENTY WEEK BANS, NEW MEDICAL
EVIDENCE, AND THE EFFECT ON CURRENT
U.S. SUPREME COURT ABORTION LAW
PRECEDENT

141

begun enacting these twenty-week bans based on “substantial medical
evidence indicat[ing] that [an unborn child is] capable of [experiencing]
pain” by twenty weeks after fertilization.7
Although the purpose of these twenty-week bans may be compelling, under current Supreme Court precedent the statutes are likely per
se unconstitutional. Viability, as defined by the Court, is “the time at
which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life
outside the womb.”8 This critical point is flexible and differs from pregnancy to pregnancy,9 but many professionals today believe viability occurs at roughly twenty-three or twenty-four weeks of pregnancy.10 It is
currently undisputed that no fetus is viable at twenty weeks gestational
716 F.3d 1213); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1405 (West, Westlaw through end of 2013 Regular
and First Ex. Session, including changes made by Ark. Code Rev. Comm. received through
1/1/2014, and emerg. eff. acts from 2014 Fiscal Sess.: 210); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141 (West,
Westlaw through Act 351 of the 2014 Regular Session); IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-505 (West,
Westlaw through emergency effective legislation of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the
62nd Idaho Legislature enacted as of March 26, 2014) (held unconstitutional by McCormack,
900 F. Supp. 2d 1128); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1 (West, Westlaw through P.L.29 of the
Second Regular Session of the 118th General Assembly (2014) with effective dates through
March 13, 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.30.1 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Regular Session); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3,106 (West, Westlaw through End of 2013 Regular
Session); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-45.1 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Regular Session of the General Assembly); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-05.3 (West, Westlaw
through the 2013 Regular Session of the 63rd Legislative Assembly); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 1-745.5 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 23 (End) of the First Extraordinary Session of
the 54th Legislature (2013)); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.044 (West, Westlaw
through end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the 83rd Legislature); see also Isaacson, 716
F.3d at 1225 (“[V]iability usually occurs between twenty-three and twenty-four weeks gestation.”).
7. ALA. CODE § 26-23B-2 (West, Westlaw through Act 2014-191 of the 2014 Regular Session); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1403 (West, Westlaw through end of 2013 Regular and
First Ex. Sessions, including changes made by Ark. Code Rev. Comm. received through
1/1/2014, and emerg. eff. acts from 2014 Fiscal Sess.: 210); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-503 (West,
Westlaw through emergency effective legislation of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the
62nd Idaho Legislature enacted as of March 26, 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6722 (West,
Westlaw through 2013 regular and special session); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.30.1
(West, Westlaw through the 2013 Regular Session); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3,104(West,
Westlaw through End of 2013 Regular Session); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-745.3 (West
Westlaw through Chapter 23 (End) of the First Extraordinary Session of the 54th Legislature (2013)).
8. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (explaining that viability is the critical point in time at which the state’s interest in fetal life becomes
compelling because “the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside
the mother’s womb.”), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992).
9. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1225.
10. Id.; see also David F. Forte, Life, Heartbeat, Birth: A Medical Basis for Reform,
74 Ohio St. L.J. 121, 138 (2013) (explaining that there is no “consensus among physicians as
to when viability actually occurs” as some place threshold viability at twenty-two weeks gestational age while others place it at twenty-six weeks gestational age).
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age.11 Because the twenty-week bans enacted by the states prohibit
abortions beginning at a point in time prior to viability,12 it is likely the
United States Supreme Court would hold the laws unconstitutional under current precedent. To date, two courts have reached that same conclusion.13 In 2013, both Idaho and Arizona’s twenty-week bans were
struck down as unconstitutional.14
Although it appears the twenty-week bans cannot stand under current Supreme Court precedent, the medical evidence presented in support of these new laws and the purpose behind their enactment may
warrant the Supreme Court revisiting its prior holding in Roe marking
viability as the critical point. The Court’s holdings in major cases since
Roe suggest that at some point in the future the Court will indeed revisit Roe’s central rule. In Roe, the Court announced a woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion prior to viability and the woman’s absolute right to obtain a first-trimester abortion without state interference.15 However, since that time, the Supreme Court has slowly been
chipping away at a woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion.
In Casey, the Court “obliterated [a woman’s] absolute right to [obtain] a
first-trimester abortion” by announcing the undue burden standard.16
The undue burden standard allows the State to regulate previability
abortions so long as they do not unduly burden a woman’s right to
choose abortion.17 The Court continued to whittle away at Roe in 2007,
when in Carhart it upheld Congress’s Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003 as a permissible burden on a woman’s right to obtain a previability
abortion.18 In the Court’s opinion, the majority shifted its focus from a
woman’s right to choose and instead emphasized the importance of the
State’s interest in protecting the unborn child and maintaining respect
for the dignity of human life.19
Given the developments in the Court’s abortion law precedent, the
question remains: should the Court revisit Roe’s central rule and change
the point in time at which the State’s interest in fetal life becomes compelling from fetal viability to fetal pain as suggested by the states’ twenty-week bans? Because the Court, over the last four decades, has ex11. See Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1225.
12. See id. (“[N]o fetus is viable at twenty weeks gestational age . . . . [V]iability
usually occurs between twenty-three and twenty-four weeks gestation. Accordingly, Arizona’s ban on abortion from twenty weeks necessarily prohibits previability abortions.”).
13. See id.; see also McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1151 (D. Idaho
2013) (invalidating Idaho’s twenty-week ban).
14. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1226 (invalidating Arizona’s twenty-week ban); McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 (invalidating Idaho’s twenty-week ban).
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973), holding modified by Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
16. Tracy Bach, High Noon in the Abortion Battle? Roe “Reality” Post Gonzales v.
Carhart, 32 VT. L. REV. 663, 664 (2008); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 837 (1992).
17. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
18. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007).
19. Id. at 157.
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panded the State’s interest in potential life both in scope and time by
allowing the State to place regulations on abortions from the outset of
pregnancy to protect fetal life and to maintain dignity and respect for
human life,20 medical evidence indicating that unborn children are capable of feeling pain beginning at twenty weeks gestational age may
have a significant impact on abortion law.21
Part II of this article will begin with an examination of abortion
law over the last forty years by looking at three major Supreme Court
cases. Next, part III will discuss, in depth, the impact of existing abortion law precedent on the states’ twenty-week bans. Finally, part IV of
this article will discuss the Court revisiting its central holding in Roe,
marking viability as the critical point in time where a State’s interest in
potential life becomes compelling, and replacing it with fetal pain.
PART II: ABORTION LAW PRECEDENT THROUGHOUT THE PAST
FORTY YEARS: ROE V. WADE, PLANNED PARENTHOOD V.
CASEY, & GONZALES V. CARHART
In the landmark case of Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court announced a woman’s absolute right to obtain an abortion during the first
trimester of pregnancy as well as the right of the State to ban nontherapeutic abortions22 post viability.23 However, in the years since that
groundbreaking opinion, the Court has greatly expanded the State’s interest in protecting fetal life both in time and scope. 24 In 1992, the Court
in Casey rejected Roe’s trimester framework and with it a woman’s absolute right to obtain a first-trimester abortion.25 In place of the tri20. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 837 (expanding the State’s interest in fetal life in time by
adopting the undue burden standard allowing for state regulation of abortion procedures
from the outset of pregnancy); see also Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157 (expanding the State’s interest in fetal life in scope by upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 as a permissible regulation on previability abortions because it showed “respect for the dignity of human
life”).
21. See supra note 7 (listing the various state statutes that include legislative findings regarding the capacity of a fetus to feel pain at twenty weeks gestational age).
22. See generally Therapeutic Abortion, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/therapeutic%20abortion (last visited June 29,
2014) (defining therapeutic abortion as an “abortion induced when pregnancy constitutes a
threat to the physical or mental health of the mother.”).
23. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973), holding modified by Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, (1992) (setting out the trimester framework).
24. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 837 (expanding the State’s interest in fetal life in time by
adopting the undue burden standard allowing for state regulation of abortion procedures
from the outset of pregnancy); see also Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157 (expanding the State’s interest in fetal life in scope by upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 as a permissible regulation on previability abortions because it showed “respect for the dignity of human
life.”).
25. Casey, 505 U.S. at 837.
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mester framework the Court adopted the undue burden standard allowing the State to regulate previability abortions in order to further its
interest not only in maternal health, but also in the life of the fetus, expanding the State’s interest in protecting fetal life in time.26 Although
the Court in Casey explicitly upheld Roe’s central rule, that a woman
has a constitutional right to obtain an abortion prior to fetal viability,27
the ruling “left no doubt that the Court had struck a new balance between the state’s interest in protecting life and a woman’s right to
choose.”28
The Court continued to cut back on Roe and expand the State’s interest in potential life in its 2007 holding in Carhart.29 There, the Court
upheld Congress’s Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 as a permissible regulation on previability abortions under the undue burden standard.30 The majority in Carhart stressed the importance of the State’s
interest in the life of the fetus and expanded that interest to include respect and dignity for human life.31 The following portion of this article
will look in depth at these three major Supreme Court rulings that have
shaped abortion law over the last forty years.
A. Roe v. Wade
In 1973 the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the issue of
a woman’s right to obtain an abortion.32 In Roe, the Court held that a
woman has a constitutional right, encompassed within the right to privacy and the right to liberty under the substantive component of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to choose to terminate her pregnancy before fetal viability.33 Although the Court recog26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Bach, supra note 16, at 663.
29. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 156–57 (upholding Congress’s Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003 under the undue burden standard after finding “[t]he Act expresse[d] respect for the dignity of human life.”). This decision expanded the State’s interest in fetal life
in scope since the State’s interest in fetal life now encompasses not only protection of fetal
life, but also maintaining dignity and respect for human life. Id.
30. Id. at 156 (“The Act does not on its face impose a substantial obstacle, and we
reject this further facial challenge to its validity.”).
31. Id. at 157–158 (holding that the State’s interest in potential life from the outset
of pregnancy cannot be treated as unimportant, and thus finding that the State can use its
regulatory power to express respect for the dignity of human life).
32. The Supreme Court and Abortion Access, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES
1 (Aug. 2008), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/repro/abortion/thesupreme-court-and-abortion.pdf (discussing that prior to 1850 abortion was legal in the
United States, but beginning in 1850 states began enacting strict bans on abortions leading
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe holding “that access to abortion is a fundamental
constitutional right that government may not restrict without a very strong reason–a state
interest that must be ‘compelling’”).
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (“[T]he right of personal privacy includes
the abortion decision.”), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992). The Roe court also held that “[a] state criminal abortion statute . . . that
excepts from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard

2014]

TWENTY WEEK BANS, NEW MEDICAL
EVIDENCE, AND THE EFFECT ON CURRENT
U.S. SUPREME COURT ABORTION LAW
PRECEDENT

145

nized a woman’s fundamental right to obtain an abortion, it made clear
that such a right was not absolute.34 In determining when the State
could interfere with a woman’s fundamental right to choose abortion,
the Court used strict scrutiny review and set out the trimester framework.35
Under the trimester framework, the Court determined that during
the first trimester of pregnancy, the time prior to twelve weeks gestational age, “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.”36
Thus, during that time, the State could not place regulations on abortion procedures for any reason.37 However, the Court held that during
the second trimester of pregnancy the State’s interest in the health of
the pregnant woman became compelling; therefore, State regulations of
abortion procedures to maintain maternal health during that time were
permitted.38 Further, the Court found that at twenty-eight weeks gestational age a fetus was viable. 39 At that time, the Court deemed the
State’s interest in potential life sufficiently compelling to warrant prohibitions on abortion except where necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother.40 Thus, under Roe and the trimester framework: a
woman had the absolute right to obtain a first-trimester abortion without State interference, viability was deemed the critical point in time at
which the State could prohibit abortions to further its interest in potential life, and, between those two points in time, the State could regulate
abortion procedures only to further its interest in maternal health.41
In parsing out the State’s dual interests in maternal health and fetal life under the trimester framework, the Court declared that the
State has “an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman [and] . . . another important
and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.” 42
The Court went on to explain that:
These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during
pregnancy, each becomes compelling. With respect to the State’s
to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Id. at 164.
34. Id. at 154.
35. See id. at 155, 164–66.
36. Id. at 164.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 163–64.
39. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
40. Id. at 164–65.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 162.
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important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother,
the ‘compelling’ point, in light of present medical knowledge, is
at approximately the end of the first trimester. . . . With respect
to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life,
the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus
then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside
the mother’s womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after
viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the
State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may
go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period except when
it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.43
In establishing this trimester framework, the Court undertook the
challenge of balancing the State’s interests in maternal health and fetal
life against the pregnant woman’s constitutional right to choose abortion.44 To achieve this task, the Court, and specifically Justice
Blackmun, the author of the Roe opinion, relied heavily on medical evidence and approached the issue of abortion as a medical problem and
not as a legal or moral issue.45 Under this approach, Justice Blackmun
focused on the medical consequences of an abortion at each stage of
pregnancy.46
During the first trimester of pregnancy, Justice Blackmun found
that the “[m]ortality rate[] for women undergoing early abortions . . .
appear[ed] to be as low as or lower” than that associated with natural
childbirth.47 Based on this medical evidence, Justice Blackmun declared
the right of a woman’s physician to determine, based on his or her medical judgment, if the woman’s pregnancy should be terminated and to do
so without interference from the State.48 Although Justice Blackmun
focused on the right of the woman’s physician to determine abortion for
her rather than the woman’s right to choose abortion for herself, this is
not surprising as the statute at issue in Roe criminalized physicians for
performing abortions and not women for obtaining them.49 Thus, Roe
gave the woman the absolute right to choose to obtain a first-trimester
abortion and allowed her physician, based on his medical judgment, to
perform such an abortion without criminal penalties because of the low
mortality rate for abortions during this time period.50
43. Id. at 162–64.
44. See id. at 162–65 (explaining the State’s dual interests in maternal health and
potential life and setting out the trimester framework so as to allow the State to assert its
interests while not trampling over the woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion).
45. See id. at 149, 160–61, 163; Forte, supra note 10, at 123.
46. See infra notes 47, 51, 54 and accompanying text.
47. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149. Thus, the “State’s . . . concern in enacting a criminal abortion law . . . to protect the pregnant woman, that is, to restrain her from submitting to a procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy” is not a valid concern during the first trimester of pregnancy. Id.
48. Id. at 164.
49. Bach, supra note 16, at 665.
50. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149, 164.

2014]

TWENTY WEEK BANS, NEW MEDICAL
EVIDENCE, AND THE EFFECT ON CURRENT
U.S. SUPREME COURT ABORTION LAW
PRECEDENT

147

During the second trimester of pregnancy, medical evidence showed
that the risks associated with abortion increased; therefore, abortions
during the second trimester posed a greater danger to the life and
health of the pregnant woman.51 Because of these increased risks and
the possible consequences of an abortion, Justice Blackmun asserted
that the State’s interest in maternal health and life became compelling.52 Thus, during the second trimester, the State could regulate abortion procedures to maintain maternal health.53
At twenty-eight weeks of pregnancy, or the beginning of the third
trimester, Justice Blackmun found that the consequences of an abortion
began to impact the unborn child in a more definite way because at that
point in time a fetus was deemed viable and had the potential to survive
outside the womb.54 In making this determination, Justice Blackmun
relied on medical evidence. He pointed out that physicians and those in
the scientific arena determined that life began either “upon conception,
upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes
‘viable,’ that is, potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb . . .
with artificial aid.”55 Based on “embryological data that . . . indicate[d]
that conception [was] a ‘process’ over time, rather than an event, and . . .
medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the ‘morning-after’
pill, implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and . . . artificial
wombs,”56 Justice Blackmun rejected the notion that life began upon
conception. He ultimately settled on fetal viability, which occurred at
roughly twenty-eight weeks of pregnancy in 1973,57 as the point in time
at which the State’s interest in protecting potential life became sufficiently compelling so as to justify prohibitions on abortions.58 This was
the case because Justice Blackmun felt that, at that point in time, “the
fetus . . . ha[d] the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s
womb.”59 Moreover, he found “State regulation protective of fetal life
after viability . . . ha[d] both logical and biological justifications.”60 Thus,
51. Id. at 150 (“[T]he risk [associated with abortion] to the woman increases as her
pregnancy continues. Thus, the State retains a definite interest in protecting the woman’s
own health and safety when an abortion is proposed at a late stage of pregnancy.”).
52. See id. at 163–64 (holding that the State could infringe on the woman’s fundamental right to obtain an abortion by regulating abortion procedures “in ways . . . reasonably
related to maternal health.”).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 160, 163 (discussing that viability occurred at roughly the twenty-eighth
week of pregnancy, and at the point of viability medical evidence indicated that an unborn
child “ha[d] the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”).
55. Id. at 160.
56. Roe, 410 U.S. at 161.
57. Id. at 160.
58. Id. at 164–65.
59. Id. at 163.
60. Id.
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because an abortion after viability terminated a fetus potentially capable of survival outside the womb, the Court set viability as the critical
point in time at which the State’s interest in fetal life was compelling
enough to warrant prohibitions on abortion.
As evident from the above discussion of Roe, medical evidence
played an important role in Justice Blackmun’s formation of the trimester framework and in the Court’s determination that viability
should be the critical point in time when the State’s interest in potential
life becomes compelling. Medical evidence has continued to play a role in
the Court’s abortion law jurisprudence over the past several decades. As
indicated in the following discussion of Casey and Carhart, developments in medical evidence have allowed the Court to expand the State’s
“important and legitimate interest in [protecting] potential [human] life”
in both time and scope.61
B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
Although Roe’s central rule is still at the heart of abortion law today, in 1992 the Court, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, dramatically
altered the test for analyzing restrictions on a woman’s fundamental
right to obtain an abortion by adopting the undue burden standard.62
With the adoption of the undue burden standard, the Court, in a fractured opinion,63 expanded the State’s interest in potential life in time by
allowing for state regulation of abortion procedures from the outset of
pregnancy.64 Although the Court adopted a new test for analyzing restrictions on abortions, the Court applied the doctrine of stare decisis
and declined to completely overturn Roe.65 In declining to overturn the
landmark case, the Court reaffirmed Roe’s three central principles.66
The first principle the Court reaffirmed was “the right of [a] woman
to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without
undue interference from the State.”67 The Court explained that “[b]efore
viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect [to have an abortion].”68 The second principle
the Court confirmed from Roe was the State’s power to proscribe abortions after fetal viability.69 With regard to the second principle, the
61. Id. at 162.
62. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992).
63. Id. at 833–43 (three Justices delivered the opinion of the Court with others concurring and dissenting throughout different portions of the opinion).
64. See id. at 876 (rejecting the trimester framework and adopting the undue burden standard to allow the State to promote its interest in potential life throughout pregnancy).
65. Id. at 845–46.
66. Id. at 846.
67. Id.
68. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
69. Id.
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Court again emphasized that “[v]iability marks the earliest point at
which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.” 70 The third principle
reaffirmed by the Court was a recognition of “the State[’s] legitimate
interests from the outset of pregnancy in protecting the health of the
woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.” 71 Although the
Court declined to overrule Roe and reaffirmed Roe’s central principles,
the Court stated that Roe’s central holding erred when it came to the
strength of the State’s interest in fetal protection.72
In addressing the State’s interest in protecting the life of the fetus,
the Court expressed the opinion that the trimester framework set out in
Roe did not allow the State to assert its interest in protecting fetal life
because the State was not allowed to regulate abortions during the first
trimester and could only regulate abortions during the second trimester
to promote its interest in protecting maternal health.73 On this point,
the Court stated the following in its opinion:

Roe v. Wade was express in its recognition of the State's “important and legitimate interest[s] in preserving and protecting
the health of the pregnant woman [and] in protecting the potentiality of human life.” The trimester framework, however, does
not fulfill Roe's own promise that the State has an interest in
protecting fetal life or potential life. Roe began the contradiction
by using the trimester framework to forbid any regulation of
abortion designed to advance that interest before viability. Before viability, Roe and subsequent cases treat all governmental
attempts to influence a woman's decision on behalf of the potential life within her as unwarranted. This treatment is, in our
judgment, incompatible with the recognition that there is a substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy.74
Expanding on the State’s “substantial interest” in the unborn fetus
the Court continued on to say, “The very notion that the State has a
substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all
regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all burdens on the right
70. Id. at 835–36.
71. Id. at 846.
72. Id. at 858 (stating that the “central holding of Roe was in error [in undervaluing] the strength of the state interest in fetal protection, not to the recognition afforded by
the Constitution to the woman’s liberty.”); see also id. at 837 (“To protect the central right
recognized by Roe while at the same time accommodating the State’s profound interest in
potential life, the undue burden standard should be employed” in place of the trimester
framework).
73. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
74. Id. at 875–76 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue.” 75 This view
laid the foundation for the adoption of the undue burden standard in
place of the trimester framework.76
In rejecting the trimester framework, the Court pointed to both
flaws in the framework itself and advances in medical technology. In
regards to the flaws in the framework, the Court held: “The trimester
framework suffers from these basic flaws: in its formulation it misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman's interest; and in practice it
undervalues the State's interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe.”77
Moreover, the Court found that advances in medical technology in the
ensuing years since Roe had rendered the trimester framework “problematic.”78 The Court appeared to pick up on the position held by Justice
O’Connor in her dissenting opinion in the 1983 case of City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, where she explained:
[a]s the medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease,
the point at which the State may regulate for reasons of maternal health is moved further forward to actual childbirth. As
medical science becomes better able to provide for the separate
existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further
back toward conception.79
Thus, because of the inherent flaws in the trimester framework and
because of medical advances rendering the framework increasingly unworkable, the Court opted to reject the trimester framework.80
With the rejection of the trimester framework, the Court stated:
“To protect the central right recognized by Roe v. Wade while at the
same time accommodating the State’s profound interest in potential
life,” the undue burden standard should be employed.81 The undue burden standard announced by the Court proclaimed that the State could
regulate previability abortion procedures so long as the regulations did
not have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of women seeking to abort a nonviable fetus. 82 Therefore, under
Casey’s undue burden standard, the State may regulate previability
75. Id. at 876.
76. See id. at 875–76.
77. Id. at 873.
78. Id. at 873 (citing to Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 529 (1989) in which she described the trimester framework as
“problematic”); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
458 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the trimester framework was on a “collision course with itself”), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
79. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 458; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 (citing to Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Webster, 492 U.S. at 529, in which Justice O’Connor stated
that “I dissented from the Court's opinion in Akron because it was my view [and continues to
be my view] that, Roe's trimester framework [is] . . . problematic.”).
80. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
81. Id. at 878.
82. Id.at 877.
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abortions so long as such regulations do not unduly burden a woman’s
right to choose abortion, and the State can continue to prohibit post viability abortions.83 Thus, the adoption of the undue burden standard expanded the State’s interest in potential life in time by allowing for State
regulation of abortion procedures from the outset of pregnancy to promote the State’s interest in potential life.84
However, despite the rejection of the trimester framework, under
the undue burden standard the Court continued to uphold Roe’s central
rule marking viability as the critical point in time where the State’s interest in potential life becomes compelling.85 Although medical developments had moved the point of viability from roughly twenty-eight weeks
of pregnancy to twenty-four weeks of pregnancy,86 the Court stated that
the imprecision on the precise point of viability, which would continue to
be affected by medical advances, was within tolerable limits.87 Further,
the Court stated that fetal viability was a fair point in time to begin allowing the State to ban abortions because “a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State’s intervention on behalf of the
developing child.”88
Although the Court’s opinion in Casey expressly reaffirmed Roe’s
central rule, the “shift from Roe’s trimester [framework] to [the] undue
burden [standard] left no doubt that the Court had struck a new balance
between the State’s interest in protecting life and a woman’s right to
choose.”89 The Court’s adoption of the undue burden standard greatly
expanded the State’s interest in potential life in time by allowing for
regulation of abortion procedures from the outset of pregnancy in order
to promote the State’s interest in potential life. 90 Thus, the undue burden standard gave the State more power to regulate abortions while at
the same time taking away the woman’s absolute right to obtain a firsttrimester abortion.91 After Casey, abortion law was dramatically
changed and as Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent in Casey,

83. Id. at 878.
84. See id. at 876–77. Adoption of the undue burden standard expanded the State’s
interest in potential life in time because under the trimester framework the State was not
allowed to regulate abortion procedures during the first trimester of pregnancy, and could
only do so during the second trimester of pregnancy to promote its interest in maternal
health; however, under the undue burden stranded, the State can now regulate abortion
procedures from the outset of pregnancy to promote its interest in potential life. Id.
85. Id. at 879.
86. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
87. Id. at 870.
88. Id.
89. Bach, supra note 16, at 663.
90. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
91. Bach, supra note 16, at 664.
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“Roe continues to exist [today], but only in the way a storefront on a
western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality.”92
Between 1992 and 2000 the Court applied the undue burden
standard to six different types of abortion regulations and found only
two unconstitutional.93 In 2007, the Court again took up the issue of a
previability abortion regulation in Gonzales v. Carhart.94 This time, the
regulation at issue was one promulgated by the federal government.95
C. Gonzales v. Carhart
In the most recent Supreme Court decision regarding abortion, the
Court addressed the issue of whether Congress’s Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003 was a permissible regulation on previability abortions.96
The statute at issue in Carhart prohibited all intact dilation and extraction (“D&E”) procedures.97 The intact D&E procedure was a method
used by some physicians to terminate pregnancy in late term abortions.98 The Court ultimately upheld the Act as a constitutional regulation on previability abortions after evaluating it under the undue burden standard.99 In its opinion, the Court reviewed medical evidence presented to Congress regarding the procedure, evaluated the congressional
findings, and looked to Congress’s purpose for banning the procedure.
The medical evidence reviewed by the Court included two detailed descriptions of the intact D&E procedure, the first given by a doctor and
the second by a nurse.100 The testimonies appear to have played a key
role in not only Congress’s decision to ban the procedure, but also in the
Court’s decision to uphold the Act.101 The doctor gave the following testimony describing the procedure before Congress:
The fetus is delivered intact until the head lodges in the cervix
of the woman. At that point the doctor performing the abortion
inserts scissors into the cervix and places them by the skull of
the fetus. The doctor then “forces the scissors into the base of the

92. Casey, 505 U.S. at 954 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. Bach, supra note 16, at 663–64.
94. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, (2007).
95. Id. at 132.
96. Id. at 132 (“These cases require us to consider the validity of the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, a federal statute regulating abortion procedures.”); see also id. at
156 (“The question is whether the Act, measured by its text in this facial attack, imposes a
substantial obstacle to late-term, but previability, abortions.”).
97. Id. at 136.
98. Id. at 135.
99. Id. at 156 (“The Act does not on its face impose a substantial obstacle, and we
reject this further facial challenge to its validity.”).
100. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 138–39.
101. See id. at 157. In finding Congress had a rational reason for the enactment of
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, the Court stated, after reviewing the medical
testimony and evidence, that: “The Act expresses respect for the dignity of human life.” Id.
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skull or into the foramen magnum. Having safely entered the
skull, [the doctor] spreads the scissors to enlarge the opening.”102
The nurse’s testimony, in contrast to the doctor’s testimony, referred to
the fetus as a baby and gave a much more graphic depiction of the procedure.103 The nurse described the procedure as follows:
[The doctor] went in with forceps and grabbed the baby’s legs
and pulled them down into the birth canal. Then he delivered
the baby’s body and the arms—everything but the head. The
doctor kept the head right inside the uterus . . . . The baby’s little fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his little feet were
kicking. Then the doctor stuck the scissors in the back of his
head, and the baby’s arms jerked out, like a startle reaction, like
a flinch, like a baby does when he thinks he is going to fall. The
doctor opened up the scissors, stuck a high-powered suction tube
into the opening, and sucked the baby’s brains out. Now the baby went completely limp . . . . He cut the umbilical cord and delivered the placenta. He threw the baby in a pan, along with the
placenta and the instruments he had just used.104
Next, the Court turned to Congress’s findings regarding the procedure and the purpose behind the enactment of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban. The Court cited to Congress’s concerns about the overall negative impact of the procedure on society105 as well as the negative effects
performing the intact D&E procedure had on the medical community
and its reputation.106 Concerning the negative impact on society, Congress found that “implicitly approving such a brutal and inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit it w[ould] further coarsen society to
the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent
human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such life.”107 Further, in regards to the negative impact on the medical community, Congress cited “a moral, medical, and ethical consensus . . . that the practice
of performing a partial-birth abortion . . . [was] a gruesome and inhumane procedure that [was] never medically necessary and should be
prohibited.”108 Moreover, Congress found that “[p]artial-birth abortion . .
. confuse[d] the medical, legal, and ethical duties of physicians to pre102. Id. at 138.
103. Id. at 138–39.
104. Id. (quoting with omissions the nurse’s testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee).
105. Id. at 157.
106. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 141.
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serve and promote life, [because] the physician act[ed] directly against
the physical life of a child whom he or she had just delivered, all but the
head, out of the womb, in order to end that life.”109 Thus, Congress’s
purpose for enacting the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was to protect
humanity and the medical profession from the horrors of such a procedure.110
After reviewing the medical testimony regarding the procedure, the
legislative findings, and the purpose behind the enactment of the statue,
the Court evaluated the Act under the undue burden standard and yet
again expanded the State’s interest in potential life, this time in
scope.111 To begin its analysis, the Court emphasized the State’s interest
in protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child from the outset of pregnancy.112 The Court pointed out that “Casey rejected both
Roe’s rigid trimester framework and the interpretation of Roe that considered all previability regulations of abortion unwarranted.”113 Moreover, the Court stated that Casey overruled two prior holdings because
they “undervalued the State’s interest in potential life.”114 Thus, based
on the expansion of the State’s interest in potential life in Casey, the
Court stated, “regulations which do no more than create a structural
mechanism by which the State . . . may express profound respect for the
life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to
the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”115
Based on this expanded undue burden standard, the Court found
that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was a permissible regulation of
previability abortions.116 The Court stated that the State’s interest in
protecting the unborn child couldn’t be treated as unimportant and further held that the State could “use its voice and its regulatory authority
to show its profound respect for the life within the woman.”117 On this
point, the Court held that the Act at issue merely “expresse[d] respect
for the dignity of human life” because the ban procedure allowed a fetus
to be killed just inches before completion of the birth process. 118 In addition, the Court found that the State had “an interest in protecting the
integrity and ethics of the medical profession.”119 Thus, the Court exId. at 157.
See id. at 156–57.
See id. at 156 (holding the Act constitutional under the undue burden standard); see also id. at 157 (stating the Act merely prohibited a form of abortion that killed a
109.
110.
111.

fetus “just inches before completion of the birth process” and thus finding: “The Act express[ed] respect for human life.”). Thus, the Court expanded the State’s interest in potential
life in scope by allowing for regulations on abortion procedures to promote not only fetal life
but respect for human life.
112. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158.
113. Id. at 146.
114. Id. at 157.
115. Id. at 146.
116. Id. at 156.
117. Id. at 157–58.
118. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 156–57.
119. Id. at 157.
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panded the State’s interest in potential life in scope to encompass dignity and respect for human life and held the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act did not impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose a
previability abortion despite the fact the Act had the incidental effect of
making it more difficult to obtain such an abortion.120
As illustrated by Casey and Carhart, since Roe the Court has slowly been chipping away at a woman’s right to obtain a previability abortion without interference from the State while at the same time expanding the State’s interest in potential life in time and scope. Although
Roe’s central rule, holding women have a constitutional right to obtain a
previability abortion, is still intact, the Court in Casey and again in
Carhart showed a willingness to uphold laws protecting the life of the
unborn fetus. The question remains: How far does the State’s ability to
protect the fetus go and are laws banning abortions beginning at twenty
weeks gestational age beyond the scope of this protection?
PART III: THE IMPACT OF CURRENT SUPREME COURT
ABORTION LAW PRECEDENT ON THE STATES TWENTY-WEEK
BANS
As discussed in Part II of this article, under current Supreme Court
precedent the State can prohibit post-viability abortions and regulate
previability abortions so long as such regulations do not unduly burden
a woman’s right to make the ultimate choice to have an abortion.121 As
abortion law stands in its present state, the statutes being enacted by
states banning abortions beginning at twenty weeks post-fertilization
are unconstitutional.122 To date, two courts have come to the same conclusion.123 In McCormack v. Hiedeman, the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho held Idaho’s Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, which bans all abortions beginning at twenty weeks gestational
age, unconstitutional under Casey’s undue burden standard.124 Two
months later, in May 2013, the Ninth Circuit Court held an almost identical Arizona law per se unconstitutional in Isaacson v. Horne.125 The
court stated in its decision that the law at issue was a complete ban on
some previability abortions.126 Thus, the court held the law unconstitu-

120. See id. at 156–58.
121. See supra Part II.B (discussing Casey’s undue burden standard).
122. See infra Parts III.A, III.B, III.C, and III.D.
123. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, (D. Idaho 2013) (invalidating
Idaho’s twenty-week ban); Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 905 (2014) (invalidating Arizona’s twenty-week ban).
124. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–51.
125. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1217.
126. Id.
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tional on its face without even employing the undue burden standard.127
The following section of this article, Part III, will look at the two abovementioned cases and will evaluate their holdings under current precedent.
A. McCormack v. Hiedeman
In McCormack v. Hiedeman, decided in March 2013 by the United
States District Court for the District of Idaho, the district court took up
the constitutionality of Idaho’s Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection
Act.128 Like many similar laws enacted by various states,129 the Idaho
law mimics proposed federal legislation130 and asserts a new compelling
state interest in preventing fetal pain.131 The Idaho legislation reads as
follows:
No person shall perform or induce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion upon a woman when it has been determined,
by the physician performing or inducing the abortion or by another physician upon whose determination that physician relies,
that the probable postfertilization age of the woman’s unborn
child is twenty (20) or more weeks unless, in reasonable medical
judgment: (1) she has a condition that so complicates her medical condition as to necessitate the abortion of her pregnancy to
avert her death or to avert serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function, not including psychological or emotional conditions; or (2) it is necessary to preserve the life of an unborn child. No such condition
shall be deemed to exist if it is based on a claim or diagnosis
that the woman will engage in conduct that she intends to result
in her death or in substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function.132
Idaho’s Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, like legislation
enacted in other states, is based on the State’s assessment of medical
evidence indicating that an unborn child can feel pain as early as twenty
weeks gestational age.133 Federal congressional findings regarding the
127. Id. at 1225.
128. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–51.
129. See supra note 4.
130. See Forte, supra note 10, at 134 (“Ten states have passed a version of the PainCapable Unborn Child Protection Act. The Act prohibits abortion after twenty weeks of
pregnancy based on the State’s assessment of medical evidence that the unborn child could
experience pain as early as twenty weeks. Nebraska was the first state to pass a version of
the Act in 2010, which borrows its language from proposed federal bills.”).
131. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-503 (West 2013).
132. Id. at § 18-505.
133. Id. at § 18-503; see also supra note 7 (listing the various state statutes that include legislative findings regarding the capacity of a fetus to feel pain at twenty weeks gestational age); see also Forte, supra note 10, at 134 (“The [Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protec-
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capability of fetuses to experience pain, which have greatly influenced
the enactment of these various state statutes, assert the following:
Pain receptors . . . are present throughout the unborn child’s entire body and nerves link these receptors to the brain’s thalamus
and subcortical plate by no later than 20 weeks after fertilization.134 […] After 20 weeks, the unborn child reacts to stimuli
that would be recognized as painful if applied to an adult human, for example, by recoiling.135 […] For the purposes of surgery on unborn children, fetal anesthesia is routinely administered and is associated with a decrease in stress hormones compared to their level when painful stimuli are applied without
such anesthesia. In the United States, surgery of this type is being performed by 20 weeks after fertilization and earlier in specialized units affiliated with children’s hospitals.136
The position, asserted by some physicians, that the unborn child
is incapable of experiencing pain until a point later in pregnancy
than 20 weeks after fertilization predominately rests on the assumption that the ability to experience pain depends on the cerebral cortex and requires nerve connections between the thalamus and the cortex. However, recent medical research and analysis, especially since 2007, provides strong evidence for the conclusion that a functioning cortex is not necessary to experience
pain.137
Substantial evidence indicates that children born missing the
bulk of the cerebral cortex, those with hydronencephaly, nevertheless experience pain.138 […] In adult humans and in animals,
stimulation or ablation of the cerebral cortex does not alter pain
perception, while stimulation or ablation of the thalamus
does.139 […] The position, asserted by some commentators, that
the unborn child remains in a coma-like sleep state that precludes the unborn child experiencing pain is inconsistent with
the documented reaction of the unborn children to painful stimuli and with the experience of fetal surgeons who have found it
tion] Act prohibits abortion after twenty weeks of pregnancy based on the State’s assessment
of medical evidence that the unborn child could experience pain as early as twenty weeks.”).
134. 159 CONG. REC. H3730-01 (daily ed. June 18, 2013).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 3731.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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necessary to sedate the unborn child with anesthesia to prevent
the unborn child from engaging in vigorous movement in reaction to invasive surgery.140 […] [T]here is substantial medical evidence that an unborn child is capable of experiencing pain at
least by 20 weeks after fertilization, if not earlier.141
It is the purpose of the Congress to assert a compelling governmental interest in protecting the lives of unborn children from
the stage at which substantial medical evidence indicates that
they are capable of feeling pain.142 […] The compelling government interest in protecting the lives of unborn children from the
stage at which substantial medical evidence indicates that they
are capable of feeling pain is intended to be separate from and
independent of the compelling governmental interest in protecting the lives of unborn children from the stage of viability, and
neither governmental interest is intended to replace the other.143
Although the evidence presented by Idaho, and other states, regarding the purpose behind the enactment of the Pain-Capable Unborn
Child Protection Act is compelling and the argument that the State has
an interest in protecting unborn children beginning at the time in which
they are capable of feeling pain a logical one, the Idaho District Court in
McCormack struck down the Act as unconstitutional.144 In reaching its
decision to strike down the law as unconstitutional, the district court
was bound by prior Supreme Court precedent.145 Thus, the district court
used the undue burden standard set out in Casey in evaluating the constitutionality of Idaho’s twenty-week ban.146
The district court in McCormack reasoned that, under the undue
burden standard, Idaho’s twenty-week ban was unconstitutional for two
major reasons. First, the district court found that the Act did not fall
into either of the two “permissible” categories of regulations on previability abortions upheld by the Supreme Court as constitutional.147 Second, the district court held that the purpose of the law was to place an
140. 159 CONG. REC. H3730-01 (daily ed. June 18, 2013).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1151 (D. Idaho 2013).
145. Id. at 1149 (discussing how “[t]he Idaho legislature enacted the PUCPA in the
face of the Idaho Attorney General’s declaration that it is likely unconstitutional because it
prohibits some non-therapeutic abortions before a fetus has reached viability,” and then
continuing on to quote Casey and the undue burden standard).
146. Id. at 1149–51.
147. Id. at 1149–50 (asserting that “in Casey, the Supreme Court held that the
state’s dual interests in fetal life and maternal health permit only two broad categories of
regulations before fetal viability[:]” those to insure informed consent and those to protect the
health and safety of the mother. Based on this, the court found that Idaho’s PUCPA did not
fall into either category).

2014]

TWENTY WEEK BANS, NEW MEDICAL
EVIDENCE, AND THE EFFECT ON CURRENT
U.S. SUPREME COURT ABORTION LAW
PRECEDENT

159

insuperable obstacle in the way of women seeking previability abortions
and the effect of the law did just that, both of which are prohibited under the undue burden standard.148 Thus, the district court struck down
the Idaho Act as unconstitutional.149
Under its first line of reasoning, the court explained that the
State’s dual interests in fetal life and maternal health permit only two
broad categories of previability regulations: measures to ensure that a
women’s choice is informed and regulations to protect the health and
safety of the mother.150 Because the Supreme Court itself has never
made such an assertion, a discussion of how the district court appeared
to reach this conclusion is necessary before examining the district
court’s analysis of why the twenty-week ban did not fit into either permissible category.
Although unclear from the court’s opinion, it seems the district
court in McCormack came to the conclusion that only two permissible
categories of previability regulations exist under the undue burden
standard by examining prior Supreme Court holdings.151 Post Casey,
under the undue burden standard, the Supreme Court has upheld five
types of regulations on previability abortions: 1) regulations requiring
parental consent, or, alternatively, a judicial decree, before a physician
performs an abortion on a minor;152 2) regulations requiring abortion
facilities to file a report on each abortion performed; 153 3) regulations
requiring physicians to provide information on abortions and other options to a woman prior to performing an abortion;154 4) regulations requiring physicians to wait twenty-four hours after a woman first tries to
procure an abortion before performing such abortion;155 and 5) the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 at issue in Carhart that banned the
intact D&E procedure.156
The first two types of regulations discussed above fall into the district court’s “permissible” category of “regulations protecting the health
and safety of the mother,”157 while the third and fourth type of regula148. Id. at 1151.
149. Id.
150. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–50.
151. See id.
152. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992).
153. Id. at 900–01.
154. Id. at 881–87.
155. Id.
156. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007).
157. Four Justices in Casey concluded that a regulation requiring parental consent
ensured the welfare of minor mothers, while a regulation requiring abortion clinics to report
on abortion procedures furthered the State’s interest in maternal health. See Casey, 505 U.S.
at 841. However, three other Justices in Casey concluded that the parental consent provision
was designed to ensure informed consent. See id. at 899–900.
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tions fall into the court’s second category of “permissible” regulations
“ensuring that a woman’s choice is informed.”158 However, understanding which of the two “permissible” categories of previability regulations
the district court placed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act in is more
difficult. The only way the Act seems to fall into either category is to
place it in the category of regulations ensuring a woman’s informed
choice. Placing it in such a category is logical because, the argument
goes, a woman fully informed of what the intact D&E procedure entailed
would never elect to have it done.159 Thus, by enacting the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act, Congress was merely imposing a regulation ensuring
a woman’s informed consent by requiring the result that any informed
woman would reach.160
In the district court’s analysis of Idaho’s twenty-week ban in
McCormack, the court held that the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act did not fall into either of the two “permissible” categories of
previability regulations.161 The district court found that the Act did not
protect maternal health or safety because “[w]hen the Idaho legislature
enacted the PUCPA, no mention was made of the health and safety of
the mother.”162 Rather, the court found, the primary purpose of the Act
was to protect the fetus—not the pregnant woman.163 Further, the court
found that the Act did not ensure a woman’s informed choice because
the Act was “not designed to make women more informed”; rather, its
clear purpose was to narrow the universe of previously allowable previability abortions since it categorically banned non-therapeutic abortions
at and after twenty weeks.164 Thus, because the Act did not protect maternal health or safety nor did it ensure an informed choice, the court
found that it did not fall into either “permissible” category of previability
abortion regulations.165
The district court’s second reason for holding Idaho’s twenty-week
ban unconstitutional centered on the purpose and the effect of the

158. See id. at 887 (discussing how the regulations at issue requiring a physician to
provide a woman with information on abortion and other options twenty-four hours prior to
performing an abortion ensured the woman’s informed consent).
159. Bach, supra note 16, at 668–69; see also Carhart, 550 U.S. at 160 (“It is a reasonable inference that a necessary effect of the regulation and the knowledge it conveys will
be to encourage some women to carry the infant to full term, thus reducing the absolute
number of late-term abortions. The medical profession, furthermore, may find different and
less shocking methods to abort the fetus in the second trimester, thereby accommodating
legislative demand. The State’s interest in respect for life is advanced by the dialogue that
better informs the political and legal systems, the medical profession, expectant mothers,
and society as a whole of the consequences that follow from a decision to elect a late-term
abortion.”).
160. See Bach, supra note 16, at 668–69.
161. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1150 (D. Idaho 2013).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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law.166 The court stated that “an undue burden exists, and therefore a
provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus
attains viability.”167 The court found that the purpose behind the enactment of Idaho’s twenty-week ban was not to inform or protect a
woman’s health.168 Instead, the court found it was enacted with “the
specific purpose of placing an insurmountable obstacle in the path of
women seeking an abortion after twenty weeks, but before the fetus
ha[d] attained viability.”169 Based on these findings the court concluded
that the sole purpose behind the enactment of the law was to “narrow
the scope of allowable previability abortions in the name of fetal
pain.”170 Thus, the court held the purpose behind the law’s enactment
made the law unconstitutional under the undue burden standard. 171
Moreover, the court also found the law unconstitutional because
the effect of the law was to place a substantial obstacle in the path of
women seeking an abortion before fetal viability.172 The court held that
“an outright ban on abortions at or after twenty weeks’ gestation . . .
place[d] not just a substantial obstacle, but an absolute obstacle, in the
path of women seeking such abortions.”173 Thus, the court held the effect
of Idaho’s twenty-week ban made the law unconstitutional under the
undue burden standard.174
B. Analysis of the District Court’s Holding in McCormack
Although the district court’s holding striking down the PainCapable Unborn Child Protection Act as unconstitutional appears correct under current abortion law precedent, the reasoning used by the
court to reach that conclusion appears flawed for two reasons. First, the
assertion by the court that there are only two permissible categories of
abortion regulations before fetal viability 175 is problematic. Second, the
employment of the undue burden standard by the court to evaluate the
twenty-week ban is wrong because the statute places an outright ban on
some previability abortions.
In regard to the first reason, the court’s assertion that only two
permissible categories of previability regulations exist is unsound on
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 1151.
McCormack, 900 F. Supp. at 1149.
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1151.
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1151.
Id.
McCormack, 900 F. Supp. at 1151.
Id.
Id. at 1149.
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two grounds. First, the Supreme Court itself has never stated that only
two permissible categories of previability abortion regulations exist.176
The Court has only stated that a state regulation on abortion cannot
have the “purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”177 Thus, the assertion by the district court that there are only two permissible categories
of previability regulations requires an inference to be drawn that since
the Supreme Court has never upheld any other category of previability
abortion regulation in the past it will never do so in the future. This
conclusion is unsound given the fact that the Court has never put such a
restriction on itself and has, in fact, been expanding the State’s interest
in protecting fetal life so as to conceivably uphold more regulations on
abortions furthering this interest in the future.
Further, the court’s assertion that only two permissible categories
of previability abortion regulations exist is flawed on the grounds that
Idaho’s twenty-week ban and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act are
indistinguishable under the court’s apparent reasoning for placing the
latter Act in the category of permissible regulations ensuring informed
consent. A strong argument can be made that the two Acts should be
treated in the same manner under the court’s categorization system.
Similar to the argument described above for the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act, one can argue that Idaho’s twenty-week ban ensures informed
consent because no woman fully informed of a fetus’s capability to feel
pain at twenty weeks gestational age would elect to have an abortion
after that time. Therefore, as Congress did when it enacted the PartialBirth Abortion Ban, Idaho was merely imposing a regulation to ensure
the result that any well-informed woman would reach. Thus, the court’s
reasoning for holding the Pain Capable Unborn Child Protection Act
unconstitutional is flawed because the district court’s use of the categorization system is unsound.
In addition, the court’s reasoning for holding Idaho’s twenty-week
ban unconstitutional is flawed because the court used the undue burden
standard to evaluate the constitutionality of the law. In Casey, the Su176. In discussing the undue burden standard, the Court in Casey set forth some
guiding principles for courts to follow in applying the standard. The Court stated, “Some
guiding principles should emerge. What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no
more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a
minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a
substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose. Unless it has that effect
on her right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over
abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal. Regulations designed to foster the
health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.”
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877–78 (1992). Thus, the Court never
laid down a hard and fast rule that only two permissible categories of previability regulations exist.
177. Id. at 877 (“A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that
a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”).
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preme Court held that “viability marks the earliest point [in time] at
which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”178 Further, the Court
held that the State can regulate previability abortions so long as such
regulations do not impose an undue burden on the woman’s right to
choose.179 However, the undue burden standard is not applicable to Idaho’s twenty-week ban. This is the case because the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act bans all abortions beginning at twenty
weeks180 and viability does not occur until roughly twenty-three or
twenty-four weeks of pregnancy.181 Thus, the Act is a legislative ban on
nontherapeutic abortions before viability and is simply unconstitutional
on its face, rendering the undue burden standard inapplicable and the
court’s reasoning for holding the twenty-week ban unconstitutional
flawed.182 The Ninth Circuit Court used the same reasoning in Isaacson
v. Horne, a ruling that came down ten weeks after McCormack, to hold
Arizona’s twenty-week ban per se unconstitutional.183
C. Isaacson v. Horne
In Isaacson v. Horne the Ninth Circuit Court took up the constitutionality of an Arizona statute banning abortions beginning at twenty
weeks of pregnancy.184 The Arizona statute at issue in Isaacson was almost identical to the Idaho statute at issue in McCormack.185 The stated
purpose of the law was to curtail the risks to a woman’s health associated with a late-term abortion and ban abortions starting at twenty weeks
of pregnancy where strong medical evidence indicates that an unborn
child feels pain during an abortion at that age of gestation.186 The Arizona law reads in pertinent part:
Except in a medical emergency, a person shall not perform, induce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion unless the
physician or the referring physician has first made a determination of the probable gestational age of the unborn child. In making that determination, the physician or referring physician
shall make any inquiries of the pregnant woman and perform or
178.
179.
180.
181.
905 (2014).
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 860.
Id. at 876.
McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d, at 1151.

Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1225 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.

See id. at 1225–26.
Id.
Id.
See Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1217–18; McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149.
Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1218.
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cause to be performed all medical examinations, imaging studies
and tests as a reasonably prudent physician in the community,
knowledgeable about the medical facts and conditions of both
the woman and the unborn child involved, would consider necessary to perform and consider in making an accurate diagnosis
with respect to gestational age.
Except in a medical emergency, a person shall not knowingly
perform, induce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion on a
pregnant woman if the probable gestational age of her unborn
child has been determined to be at least twenty weeks.187
In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court reversed a district court’s
ruling holding the above cited law constitutional and instead held the
law per se unconstitutional.188 The district court had found the law constitutional under the undue burden standard as a permissible regulation on previability abortions.189 However, the Ninth Circuit found the
use of the undue burden standard faulty because the law placed a ban
on some previability abortions.190 In reaching its holding, the court set
out three main points regarding viability and the law. First, the court
pointed out that the parties in the case agreed that no fetus was viable
at twenty weeks gestational age.191 Second, the court found that as of
now, based on medical evidence, viability usually does not occur until
twenty-three or twenty-four weeks of pregnancy.192 Lastly, the court
stated that Arizona’s law banned all abortions starting at twenty weeks
of pregnancy unless a medical emergency existed that threatened the
mother’s life or health.193 Thus, based on these findings, the court found
Arizona’s twenty-week ban per se unconstitutional under Supreme
Court precedent as it banned some previability abortions. In its opinion,
the court reiterated the Supreme Court’s holding that the State’s interest in potential life does not become compelling until viability,194 and
stated the medical emergency exception in Arizona’s statute did not
transform it into a permissible regulation on previability abortions.195

187. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2159 (West, Westlaw through the First Regular and
First Special Sessions of the Fifty-first Legislature (2013)).
188. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1217, 1225–26.
189. Id. at 1225.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1226.
194. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1217. (“[A] woman has a constitutional right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy before the fetus is viable. A prohibition on the exercise of that right
is per se unconstitutional.”). Thus, the Court held Arizona’s law invalid on its face. Id. at
1225.
195. Id. at 1227.
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D. Analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s Holding in Isaacson
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning for holding Arizona’s twenty-week
ban unconstitutional appears spot-on under current abortion law precedent. As abortion law stands right now, bans on previability abortions
are per se unconstitutional.196 The Court has stated repeatedly that the
State’s interest in potential life does not become compelling enough to
justify a ban on abortions until the point of viability. 197 Although the
district courts in Idaho and Arizona used Casey’s undue burden standard to evaluate the constitutionality of the twenty-week bans at issue in
McCormack and Isaacson,198 it seems clear that the Ninth Circuit Court
was correct in holding Arizona’s twenty-week ban unconstitutional on
its face. Although it seems clear that the twenty-week bans being enacted by the states are per se unconstitutional under current Supreme
Court precedent, the question remains: in light of new medical evidence
regarding fetal pain, should the Supreme Court revisit Roe’s central rule
marking viability as the critical point in time at which the State’s interest in potential life becomes compelling enough to warrant a ban on
abortions, and replace it with fetal pain?
PART IV: SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT REVISIT ROE V.
WADE’S CENTRAL HOLDING MARKING VIABILITY AS THE
CRITICAL POINT IN TIME AT WHICH THE STATE’S INTEREST IN
POTENTIAL LIFE BECOMES COMPELLING ENOUGH TO
WARRANT PROSCRIPTION OF ABORTION AND REPLACE IT WITH
FETAL PAIN?
A strong argument can be made that fetal pain, not fetal viability,
should be the critical point in time at which the State’s interest in potential life becomes compelling enough to warrant prohibitions on abortion procedures. This is the case for four main reasons. First, fetal pain
is a more workable point in time at which to deem the State’s interest in
fetal life compelling because it is a more conclusive point. 199 Second, replacing Roe’s central rule marking viability as the critical point with
196. “First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Before viability,
the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.” Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
197. See id.; see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
198. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1225; McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128,
1149–51 (D. Idaho 2013).
199. See infra Part IV.C.i.
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fetal pain would not cause “serious inequity” to those who rely on abortion.200 Third, over the last four decades, the Court has expanded the
State’s interest in fetal life both in time and scope allowing state regulation of previability abortions from the outset of pregnancy to preserve
fetal life and ensure dignity and respect for human life.201 Allowing the
State to ban abortions beginning at the time unborn children are capable of feeling pain is, thus, logical under this expansion of the State’s
interest in fetal life.202 Finally, allowing the State to prohibit abortions
beginning at the time unborn children have the capacity to feel pain is
both relevant and justifiable.203 Thus, the Supreme Court should revisit
its prior holding in Roe because a strong argument can be made that
Roe’s central rule marking viability as the critical point should be replaced with fetal pain.
Part A of this section of the article will examine the doctrine of
stare decisis and the framework set out by the Court in Casey for evaluating and overturning precedent. Part B will then address how the
Court in Casey applied the framework to conclude that Roe should not
be overturned. In Part C, the framework from Casey will be applied to
Roe today, post Casey and Carhart, and the four factors discussed above
will be evaluated in greater detail in addressing whether the Court
should change the critical point from fetal viability to fetal pain. Part D
will briefly conclude this section.
A. Stare Decisis and the Framework for Re-Examining and Overturning
Abortion Law Precedent
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Supreme Court will not
lightly overrule its prior holdings marking viability as the critical point
in time where the State’s interest in fetal life becomes compelling
enough to justify a prohibition on abortion.204 “The [Supreme] Court operates as an institution, and the . . . Justices . . . operate within its institutional framework.”205 Within that institutional framework is the doctrine of stare decisis that the Court, to some degree, is bound by. 206 The
doctrine of stare decisis stands for the premise that judges should follow
the same reasoning used in prior cases when deciding similar cases in
the future.207 This means that “what [the Court] has done in the past, it
will continue to do in the future.”208

200. See infra Part IV.C.ii.
201. See infra Part IV.C.iii.
202. See infra Part IV.C.iii.
203. See infra Part IV.C.iv.
204. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
205. Robert A. Sedler, The Supreme Court Will Not Overrule Roe v. Wade, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1207, 1207–08 (2006).
206. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
207. Stare
Decisis,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/stare%20decisis (last visited June 29, 2014) (defining stare decisis as

2014]

TWENTY WEEK BANS, NEW MEDICAL
EVIDENCE, AND THE EFFECT ON CURRENT
U.S. SUPREME COURT ABORTION LAW
PRECEDENT

167

In Casey, the Court explained that necessity requires the Court, to
some extent, to follow the doctrine of stare decisis209 and specifically rejected the argument that it should overrule its prior holding in Roe announcing a woman’s constitutional right to obtain a previability abortion.210 The Court stated:
[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a
prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the
respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. 211
With this in mind, the Court laid out a series of questions that it
would evaluate in determining whether or not to overturn Roe. 212 The
Court stated:
[W]e may enquire whether Roe’s central rule has been found
unworkable; whether the rule’s limitation on state power could
be removed without serious inequity to those who have relied
upon it or significant damage to the stability of the society governed by it; whether the law’s growth in the intervening years
has left Roe’s central rule a doctrinal anachronism discounted by
society; and whether Roe’s premises of fact have so far changed
in the ensuing two decades as to render its central holding
somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it
addressed.213
Based on these inquiries, the Court declined to overrule the landmark
case.214
B. The Court’s Application of the Framework in Casey in Deciding Not
to Overturn Roe
In declining to overturn Roe, the Court used the framework discussed above.215 Under the framework the Court found that Roe’s central premise had not been weakened by subsequent decisions and that
“a doctrine or policy of following rules or principles laid down in previous judicial decisions
unless they contravene the ordinary principles of justices”).
208. Sedler, supra note 205, at 1208.
209. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
210. Id. at 853.
211. Id. at 854.
212. Id. at 855.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 855–61; see also Sedler, supra note 205, at 1209–10.
215. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855–61.
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the ruling in Roe was still supported by the doctrine and premises on
which it was based.216 To reach this conclusion, the Court took up, in
turn, each of the four questions set out in the framework.217
First, the Court in Casey evaluated whether Roe’s central rule, that
the State cannot proscribe previability abortions, was unworkable.218
The Court answered this in the negative.219 In reaching that conclusion,
the Court held that Roe’s central rule represented “a simple limitation
beyond which a state law is unenforceable.”220 Based on that, the Court
found that the required determination, that is, whether a law violates
“the exercise of the choice guaranteed against government infringement” was “within judicial competence.” 221 Thus, the Court in Casey
found Roe’s central rule, which marked viability as the critical point,
workable.222
The second question the Court in Casey evaluated in deciding
whether or not to overturn Roe’s central rule was “whether the rule’s
limitation on state power could be removed without serious inequity to
those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of
the society governed by it.” 223 The Court also answered this question in
the negative finding that overruling Roe and its central rule, marking
viability as the critical point, would negatively affect individuals and
society as a whole.224 In making that finding, the Court stated:
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail. [Further,] [t]he ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.225
Thus, the Court found that Roe’s central rule should not be overruled
because both individuals and society as a whole relied on a woman’s
right to obtain an abortion.226
The third question the Court looked at in Casey in determining if
Roe should be overruled was “whether the law’s growth in the intervening years ha[d] left Roe’s central rule a doctrinal anachronism discounted by society . . . .”227 The Court broadly answered this question in the
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 860–61; Sedler, supra note 205, at 1209–10.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 855–61.
Id. at 855.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 855–56.
Id.
Id. at 856.
Id.
Id. at 857–59.
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negative, but found that Roe’s central rule undervalued the State’s interest in potential life.228 The Court analyzed a woman’s right to obtain
an abortion under the liberty prong of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution and also under the theory of sui generis. 229 The Court found
that regardless of the theory used to protect a woman’s constitutional
right to obtain an abortion, the right had been upheld by a majority of
justices in the years between Roe and Casey.230 However, the Court also
stated that if “the central holding in Roe was in error, that error would
go . . . to the strength of the state interest in fetal protection, not the
recognition afforded by the Constitution to the woman’s liberty.”231
Thus, the Court found Roe’s central rule had not been discounted by the
law’s growth in the years since Roe, but recognized that Roe’s central
rule did not afford the State a great enough interest in protecting the
life of the unborn child.232 In remedying this issue, the Court declined to
outright overrule Roe, but tweaked its central rule by abandoning the
trimester framework and adopting the undue burden standard affording
the State a greater interest in potential life while continuing to uphold
the woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion.233
The final question the Court in Casey evaluated in determining if it
should overrule Roe was “whether Roe’s premises of fact ha[d] so far
changed in the ensuing two decades as to render its central holding
somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed.”234 Again, the Court answered the question in the negative.235
In evaluating this question, the Court looked at developments in medical technology since Roe.236 From 1973 to 1992, advances in medical
technology had changed the point of viability from twenty-eight weeks of
pregnancy to roughly twenty-three or twenty-four weeks of pregnancy.237 Although the point of viability had changed, the Court concluded
that such a change only went to “the scheme of time limits on the realization of competing interests . . . .”238 Thus, the Court concluded that
“the divergences from the factual premises of 1973 ha[d] no bearing on
the validity of Roe’s central holding, that viability marks the earliest

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 857–59.
Id. at 858.
Id.
Id. at 857–59.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 860.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
Id. (looking at advances in maternal care and advances in neonatal care since

237.
238.

Id.
Id.
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point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.” 239
Although the Court in Casey declined to overrule Roe and recognized the importance of stare decisis in judicial jurisprudence, the Court
did tweak Roe in a major way by rejecting the trimester framework and
adopting the undue burden standard.240 In addition, the Court stated
that “the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘[irrevocable] command’ and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case”241 and emphasized
Roe’s under-appreciation for the State’s interest in potential life. 242
Thus, the Court left open the possibility of reevaluating Roe’s central
rule at a future time and, if circumstances called for such action, once
again tweaking the rule, or altogether overruling it if the four questions
set out in the framework for overturning precedent were answered in
the affirmative.
C. Applying the Framework from Casey to Roe Today in Determining if
the Court Should Change the Critical Point from Fetal Viability to Fetal
Pain
In light of new medical evidence indicating that unborn children
are capable of feeling pain at twenty weeks, the circumstances may be
right now for the Court to reevaluate Roe’s central rule marking viability as the critical point. Twenty years have passed since the Court declined to overturn Roe in Casey.243 Since that time, compelling new medical evidence regarding fetal pain has emerged244 and the Court has
greatly expanded the State’s interest in fetal life both in scope and
time.245 In addition, numerous states like Idaho and Arizona have enacted “twenty-week bans,” statutes banning previability abortions 246
and courts are split on how to evaluate and rule on such laws.247 Thus,
reevaluation of Roe’s central rule under the framework set out in Casey
239. Id.
240. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.B.
241. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 405 (1932)).
242. Id. at 875–76.
243. Id. at 883 (showing that Casey was decided 22 years ago in 1992).
244. See supra Part III.A (discussing congressional findings regarding fetal pain).
245. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 837 (expanding the State’s interest in fetal life in time by
adopting the undue burden standard allowing for state regulation of abortion procedures
from the outset of pregnancy); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (expanding the
State’s interest in fetal life in scope by upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
as a permissible regulation on previability abortions because it showed “respect for the dignity of human life”).
246. See supra note 4 (listing all the states that have enacted twenty-week ban statutes).
247. See supra Part III (discussing how the Idaho District Court for the District of
Idaho used the undue burden standard in striking down Idaho’s “twenty week ban,” how an
Arizona District Court used the undue burden in ruling Arizona’s “twenty week ban” constitutional, and how the Ninth Circuit Court struck down Arizona’s “twenty week ban” as per
se unconstitutional).
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is warranted and fetal pain instead of fetal viability should be deemed
the critical point in time at which the State’s interest in potential life
becomes compelling.
In evaluating this argument under the framework laid out in Casey
for overruling precedent, it is important to note that by changing the
critical point from fetal viability to fetal pain, or by recognizing a second
compelling State interest in fetal pain, the Court would not be required
to completely overrule Roe. Rather, like in Casey, the Court could continue to uphold Roe’s central premise, that a woman has a constitutional
right to choose abortion, while slightly tweaking the point in time at
which the State can intervene on behalf of the unborn child by proscribing nontherapeutic abortions.
i. Is Roe’s Central Rule Unworkable Today?

Roe’s central rule may no longer be workable in light of differing
court opinions regarding the constitutionality of the twenty-week bans
being enacted by the states.248 Under the framework set out in Casey,
the first question that must be evaluated in determining if Roe should
be overruled is whether or not its central rule is unworkable.249 Roe’s
central rule states that the State can prohibit post-viability abortions
but can only regulate previability abortions. 250 In Casey, the Court answered the question of unworkability in the negative and held that viability is “a simple limitation . . . within judicial competence.”251 However, because at least three different courts have decided the constitutionality of the twenty-week bans differently under current Supreme Court
precedent, viability may no longer be “a simple limitation . . . within judicial competence.”252 Thus, Roe’s central rule may no longer be workable.
Roe’s central rule marking viability as the critical point is unworkable and beyond judicial competence for four main reasons: 1) viability
248. See McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1151 (D. Idaho 2013) (holding Idaho’s “twenty week ban” unconstitutional); Isaacson v. Horne, 884 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D.
Ariz. 2012), rev’d, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 905 (2014) (holding
Arizona’s “twenty week ban” constitutional); Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1225 (9th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 905 (2014) (holding Arizona’s “twenty week ban” unconstitutional).
249. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
250. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973), holding modified by Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa.v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
251. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
252. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–51 (holding Idaho’s “twenty week ban”
unconstitutional under the undue burden standard); Isaacson, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (holding Arizona’s “twenty week ban” constitutional under the undue burden standard); Isaacson,
716 F.3d at 1225 (holding Arizona’s “twenty week ban” per se unconstitutional).
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is a variable point,253 2) courts have trouble distinguishing abortion
bans from abortion regulations under current precedent,254 3) the undue
burden standard is amorphous,255 and 4) it is unclear whether regulations can only permissibly be justified by preserving maternal health or
ensuring informed consent.256
First, viability is a variable point and changes from pregnancy to
pregnancy.257 Because of this, there is no conclusive point in time at
which viability occurs.258 Although a majority of specialists estimate
that viability occurs somewhere between twenty-three and twenty-four
weeks of pregnancy,259 disagreement among specialists continues.260
Some specialists estimate viability occurs as early as twenty-two weeks
of pregnancy while others estimate it to occur as late as twenty-six
weeks of pregnancy.261 Thus, because there is no conclusive point in
time at which viability occurs, the State “may not fix viability at a specific point in pregnancy” by enacting blanket laws banning abortions
based on weeks of gestation.262 For that reason, it may be difficult for
courts to evaluate if a law prohibits a previability abortion, which is unconstitutional, or a post-viability abortion, which is constitutional. This
makes Roe’s central rule, marking viability as the critical point, unworkable.
Second, under Supreme Court precedent, it is difficult for courts to
distinguish between laws that ban previability abortions and laws that
place regulations on such abortions.263 This is evidenced by the fact that

253. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1225.
254. Id. (discussing why the Arizona District Court’s use of the undue burden standard was flawed and stating the “‘undue burden’/’substantial obstacle’ mode of analysis has no
place where, as here, the state is forbidding certain women from choosing previability abortions rather than specifying the conditions under which such abortions are to be allowed”
and holding the law per se unconstitutional as a ban on previability abortions); Isaacson, 884
F. Supp. 2d at 971 (holding Arizona’s “regulation on abortions after 20 weeks gestational
age” constitutional); McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1150 (analyzing Idaho’s twenty week
ban under the undue burden standard as a regulation on previability abortions).
255. Courts disagree on what constitutes an “undue burden.” See McCormack, 900 F.
Supp. 2d at 1149–51 (holding Idaho’s twenty week ban unconstitutional under the undue
burden standard); Isaacson, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (holding Arizona’s twenty week ban constitutional under the undue burden standard).
256. See McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (holding that “in Casey, the Supreme
Court held that the state’s dual interests in fetal life and maternal health permit only two
broad categories of regulations before fetal viability”).
257. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1225.
258. Id.
259. Id.; see also Forte, supra note 10, at 138.
260. See Forte, supra note 10, at 138.
261. Id.
262. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1225.
263. See id. (holding Arizona’s twenty week ban per se unconstitutional because it
banned some previability abortions); Isaacson v. Horne, 884 F. Supp. 2d 961, 971 (D. Ariz.
2012), rev’d, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 905 (2014) (emphasis
added) (holding Arizona’s “regulation on abortions after 20 weeks gestational age” constitutional); McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1150 (D. Idaho 2013) (analyzing
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in McCormack the District Court held Idaho’s twenty-week ban unconstitutional as an impermissible regulation on previability abortions.264
However, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona
held Arizona’s twenty-week ban, an almost identical statute, constitutional as a permissible regulation on previability abortions.265 Moreover,
in Isaacson, the Ninth Circuit Court overturned the Arizona District
Court’s ruling and held the same statute per se unconstitutional as an
impermissible ban on previability abortions.266 Thus, because courts
have trouble distinguishing between bans on previability abortions and
regulations on such abortions, Roe’s central rule is unworkable.
Third, the undue burden standard is an indeterminate standard
rendering viability an unworkable rule. The undue burden standard announced in Casey allows State regulation of previability abortions so
long as such regulations do not unduly burden a woman’s right to
choose.267 However, courts disagree about what constitutes an undue
burden.268 In McCormack the District Court in Idaho used the undue
burden standard in striking down Idaho’s twenty-week ban.269 The
Court held that the law’s purpose and effect was to place an absolute
obstacle in the path of women seeking abortions after twenty weeks of
pregnancy, but prior to viability, and thus posed an undue burden.270
However, the District Court in Arizona upheld Arizona’s twenty-week
ban as constitutional under the undue burden standard.271 There, the
court held that the medical exceptions to the law made it a permissible
regulation on previability abortions. 272 Further, the Ninth Circuit Court
declined to even apply the undue burden standard to Arizona’s twentyweek ban because the law was not a regulation subject to the undue
burden standard.273 These cases show that the undue burden standard
is not clearly defined and courts disagree on how to apply it to laws.
Thus, viability under the undue burden standard is unworkable.

Idaho’s twenty week ban under the undue burden standard as a regulation on previability
abortions).
264. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–51.
265. Isaacson, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 971.
266. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1225.
267. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
268. See McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–51 (holding Idaho’s twenty-week ban
unconstitutional under the undue burden standard); Isaacson, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (holding Arizona’s twenty-week ban constitutional under the undue burden standard); Isaacson,
716 F.3d at 1225 (holding the undue burden standard did not even apply in the case of Arizona’s twenty-week ban).
269. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–51.
270. Id. at 1151.
271. Isaacson, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
272. Id. at 967–68.
273. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1225.
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Lastly, Roe’s central rule is unworkable because Supreme Court
precedent leaves unclear whether previability regulations can only permissibly be justified by preserving maternal health and ensuring informed consent.274 In McCormack the District Court made the assertion
that only two permissible categories of previability regulations exist:
those to ensure a woman’s informed consent and those to protect maternal health.275 Although the Supreme Court has never held that there
are only two permissible categories of regulations,276 an examination of
prior Supreme Court holdings suggests this could be the case—with the
possible exception of Carhart—as the Court has yet to uphold any other
type of previability regulation as constitutional. 277 Thus, Roe’s central
rule is unworkable because it is unclear if there are only two permissible
categories of previability regulations.
Because Roe’s central rule is unworkable, the Court could reevaluate and replace it with a more workable standard such as fetal pain. If
fetal pain became the new critical point, the central rule would be: the
State may regulate abortions prior to twenty weeks of pregnancy and
after that point may prohibit abortions. Fetal pain is a more workable
point than fetal viability because it is a more conclusive point in time.
Medical evidence shows that all unborn children are capable of feeling
pain at twenty weeks gestational age,278 whereas, there is no conclusive
point in time at which all unborn children become viable.279 Although a
majority of specialists place viability somewhere between twenty-three
and twenty-four weeks of pregnancy,280 a non-conclusive point in and of
itself, continued disagreement among specialists shows that viability
may occur anywhere from twenty-two weeks to twenty-six weeks of
pregnancy.281 Thus, if fetal pain were the critical point, the State could
enact blanket laws banning abortions at twenty weeks gestation making
it easier for courts to assess the constitutionality of such laws because
all laws banning abortions before twenty weeks would be unconstitutional. Therefore, fetal pain is a more workable rule than fetal viability
in determining when the State’s interest in fetal life is compelling
enough to warrant a prohibition on abortion.
274. See McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149; supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text (discussing why it is unclear if the Idaho District Court’s assertion that there are
only two permissible categories of previability regulations is accurate).
275. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–50.
276. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text (discussing how the Supreme
Court has only ever set out the undue burden standard holding that state regulations on
previability abortions cannot have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking a previability abortion).
277. See supra Part III.A (discussing the types of regulations upheld by the Supreme
Court post Casey and how Carhart may fit into the categorization scheme asserted by the
District Court in McCormack).
278. 159 CONG. REC. H3730-01 (daily ed. June 18, 2013).
279. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1225; see also Forte, supra note 10, at 138.
280. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1225; see also Forte, supra note 10, at 138.
281. Forte, supra note 10, at 138.
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ii: Can Roe’s Central Rule Limiting State Power Be Removed without
Serious Inequity to Those Who Have Relied Upon It or Significant
Damage to the Stability of the Society Governed by It?
The critical point could be changed from viability to fetal pain
without serious inequity to those who rely upon the right to obtain an
abortion because the Court in Casey already undermined reliance on the
absolute right to obtain a first-trimester abortion. Further, reliance on
the right to obtain a previability abortion would not be seriously disturbed by slightly tweaking the critical point in time at which the
State’s interest in fetal life becomes compelling. Under the framework
set out in Casey for evaluating abortion law precedent, the second question that must be addressed is whether or not Roe’s central rule limiting
state power can be removed without serious inequity to those who have
relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of the society governed by it.282 In Casey, the Court found that Roe’s central rule could
not be removed without serious inequity because for two decades individuals and society had relied on a woman’s right to obtain an abortion
“in the event that contraception should fail.” 283 However, although the
Court declined to overrule Roe for fear of causing inequity to those who
relied on abortion, the Court’s opinion itself greatly undermined reliance
on the right of women to obtain a first-trimester abortion.284 Further,
reliance on abortion “in the event that contraception should fail”285
would not seriously be disturbed by changing the critical point from fetal viability to fetal pain.286 Thus, Roe’s central rule could be tweaked
without serious inequity to those who rely on abortion or significant
damage to the stability of society.
After the Court’s opinion in Casey, abortion law precedent was
dramatically changed and reliance on Roe was dramatically undermined.287 As discussed in Part II.B of this article, the adoption of the
undue burden standard in Casey greatly expanded the State’s interest
in potential life.288 With that expansion, the State gained greater power
282. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
283. Id. at 855–56.
284. Id. at 837, 876–77 (adopting the undue burden standard and with it eliminating
the absolute right of a woman to obtain a previability abortion); see also Bach, supra note 16,
at 664.
285. Id. at 856.
286. See Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1218 (discussing that women seek late term abortions, including those after twenty weeks gestational age, for medical reasons, not because
contraception failed).
287. Casey, 505 U.S. at 837, 876–77.
288. See supra Part II.B (discussing how the adoption of the undue burden standard
expanded the State’s interest in fetal life in time by allowing regulations on previability
abortions).
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to regulate abortions and women lost the absolute right to obtain a firsttrimester abortion.289 As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent in
Casey, “Roe continues to exist [today], but only in the way a storefront
on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality.”290 Thus, Casey greatly undermined reliance on the absolute right to
obtain an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy.291
Because Casey undermined reliance on a woman’s absolute right to
obtain a first-trimester previability abortion, apparently without triggering the serious inequities warned of in the same case, it follows that
changing the critical point from fetal viability to fetal pain would not
dramatically disrupt reliance on the ability to obtain a previability abortion. Today, as medical evidence indicates, viability occurs at roughly
twenty-three or twenty-four weeks of pregnancy.292 Further, medical
evidence indicates that unborn children are capable of feeling pain beginning at twenty weeks gestational age.293 Thus, if the critical point
was changed from viability to fetal pain, a woman would only lose three
or four weeks in the second trimester of pregnancy in which she could
have relied on abortion under Roe’s central rule that she could no longer
rely on under the new rule. As the Court said in Casey, “a woman who
fails to act before viability has consented to the State’s intervention on
behalf of the developing child” and after that point cannot rely on abortion.294 The same can be said if the critical point were changed to fetal
pain. A woman who fails to act before the twentieth week of pregnancy
has consented to the State’s intervention on behalf of the developing
child and can no longer rely on the right to obtain an abortion. Thus,
changing the critical point to fetal pain would not cause serious inequity
to those who rely on abortion since Casey already undermined the absolute right to obtain a first-trimester abortion, and changing the critical
point would only take away three or four weeks of reliance late in the
second trimester.
Further, reliance on abortion in the event contraception failed
would not seriously be disturbed by changing the critical point from fetal viability to fetal pain because such reliance does not apply in the
late-term abortion setting. In Isaacson, the physician plaintiffs asserted
that patients “seek previability [late-term] abortions for . . . reasons
[such as the] continuation of the pregnancy pos[ing] a threat to their
health, . . . the fetus has been diagnosed with a medical condition or
anomaly, or that they are losing their pregnancy.”295 This indicates that
although women rely on abortions for a variety of reasons early on in
289. Casey, 505 U.S. at 837, 876–77; see also Bach, supra note 16, at 664.
290. Id. at 954.
291. Id. at 837, 876–77; see also Bach, supra note 16, at 664.
292. Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1225 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
905 (2014); see also Forte, supra note 10, at 138.
293. 159 CONG. REC. H3730-01 (daily ed. June 18, 2013).
294. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
295. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1218.
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pregnancies, such as failed contraception, as pregnancies progress into
the second and third trimester, the reasons for seeking late-term abortions narrow. At that point in pregnancy, there is usually a medical reason—rather than a failure of contraception—behind a woman wanting
to obtain an abortion.296 Thus, the reliance on abortion spoke of in Casey, that is, individuals’ reliance “on the availability of abortion in the
event that contraception should fail,” does not apply in the late-term
abortion setting.297
Further, for a woman who relies on a late-term previability abortion in the event that an unforeseen medical issue arises with her or her
fetus, reliance on obtaining such an abortion would not be disturbed by
changing the critical point to fetal pain if exceptions were put into the
twenty-week bans accommodating such medical reasons. Although the
current twenty-week bans have only narrow medical exceptions that do
not cover all the medical reasons for seeking a late-term previability
abortion, like fetal anomaly, the Supreme Court could require such exceptions be written into the laws. This would allow the State to assert
its interest in protecting potential life from the time at which unborn
children are capable of feeling pain, while at the same time avoiding
inequity to those who do rely on late term abortions.
Thus, because Casey already substantially undermined the ability
of women to obtain a previability first-trimester abortion298 and because
most women seeking abortion after twenty weeks gestational age do so
for a medical reason and not because contraception failed,299 changing
the critical point from viability to fetal pain would not greatly affect reliance on abortion. Further, broadening the existing medical exceptions
to the twenty-week bans would ensure that reliance on late term abortions for medical reasons would not be affected. Thus, changing the critical point in time in which the State’s interest in fetal life becomes compelling to fetal pain would not cause inequity to those who rely on abortion.
iii. Has the Law’s Growth in the Intervening Years since Roe Left Roe’s
Central Rule a Doctrinal Anachronism Discounted by Society?
In the forty years since Roe was decided, the Court’s opinions in
Casey and Carhart have left Roe’s central rule a hollow principle by expanding the State’s interest in fetal life both in scope and time.300 Under
296. Id.
297. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856; see also Isaacson, 760 F.3d at 1218.
298. Casey, 505 U.S. at 837, 876–77; see also Bach, supra note 16, at 664.
299. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1218.
300. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 837 (expanding the State’s interest in fetal life in time by
adopting the undue burden standard allowing for state regulation of abortion procedures
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the framework set out in Casey for reevaluating prior precedent, the
third question that must be looked at is “whether the law’s growth in
the intervening years has left Roe’s central rule a doctrinal anachronism
discounted by society.”301 In Casey, the Court broadly answered this
question in the negative stating that, over the years, a majority of justices had upheld the right of women to choose abortion. 302 However, the
Court also stated that Roe’s central holding erred in not affording the
State a greater interest in fetal protection.303
To remedy the error, the Court expanded the State’s interest in fetal life in time by adopting the undue burden standard.304 The undue
burden standard announced by the Court “left no doubt that the Court
had struck a new balance between the state’s interest in protecting life
and the woman’s right to choose.”305 The new standard “obliterated the
absolute right to a first-trimester abortion established in Roe and replaced it with an ‘inherently nebulous standard’ that provides states
with a high degree of regulatory flexibility.”306 Thus, after Casey, the
State is permitted to regulate abortion procedures to promote its interest in potential life throughout pregnancy307 whereas, under Roe, the
only regulations permitted were during the second trimester to protect
maternal health.308 Casey thus changed abortion law by expanding the
State’s interest in protecting fetal life in time.309
Fifteen years after Casey, the Court once again expanded the
State’s interest in potential life, this time in scope.310 In Carhart, the
Court expanded the State’s interest in potential life to encompass not
just preservation of life but also to encompass dignity and respect for
human life.311 The opinion:
[marked] a sharp turn away from framing the abortion debate in
terms of women’s rights and empowerment. In holding that the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 d[id] not pose an undue
from the outset of pregnancy); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (expanding the
State’s interest in fetal life in scope by upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
as a permissible regulation on previability abortions because it showed “respect for the dignity of human life”).
301. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
302. Id. at 857–59.
303. Id. at 858–59.
304. Id. at 837, 876–77.
305. Bach, supra note 16, at 663.
306. Id. at 664.
307. Casey, 505 U.S. at 837.
308. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
309. Casey, 505 U.S. at 837, 876–77.
310. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (expanding the State’s interest in fetal life in scope by upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 as a permissible regulation on previability abortions because it showed “respect for the dignity of human
life”).
311. Id.

2014]

TWENTY WEEK BANS, NEW MEDICAL
EVIDENCE, AND THE EFFECT ON CURRENT
U.S. SUPREME COURT ABORTION LAW
PRECEDENT

179

burden on a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion, the
court explicitly value[d] protecting fetal rights over women’s
rights.312
Thus, Carhart expanded the State’s interest in potential life in scope by
allowing regulations that protect and promote dignity and respect for
human life.313
Thus, because the Court has greatly expanded the State’s interest
in protecting fetal life in both scope and time, Roe’s central rule, marking viability as the critical point in time at which the State’s interest in
potential life becomes compelling, has become a hollow principle. This is
so because the State cannot adequately protect potential life prior to
viability through regulation alone.314 At twenty weeks gestational age, a
point in time prior to viability, unborn children are capable of feeling
pain.315 Although substantial medical evidence supports this assertion,
state regulations banning abortions at that time are likely per se unconstitutional under Roe’s central rule.316 This seems at odds with what the
Court said in both Casey and Carhart when it expanded the State’s interest in potential life in scope and time because such regulations protect and promote dignity and respect for human life. Thus, Roe’s central
rule, marking viability as the critical point, has become a doctrinal
anachronism and should be replaced with fetal pain.
iv. Has Roe’s Premises of Fact so Far Changed in the Ensuing Four
Decades as to Render Its Central Holding Somehow Irrelevant or
Unjustifiable in Dealing with the Issue It Addressed?

Roe’s central holding is irrelevant because a fetus that is deemed
viable does not necessarily have a realistic chance of survival outside
the womb.317 Further, new medical evidence indicating that unborn
children are capable of feeling pain at twenty weeks of pregnancy has
surfaced rendering Roe’s central rule unjustifiable.318 The final question
that must be evaluated in determining whether or not to overrule Roe is
312. Bach, supra note 16, at 666.
313. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157–60.
314. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. This footnote lists all the states that
have enacted statutes banning abortions beginning at twenty or twenty-two weeks gestational age in order to assert their interest in protecting fetal life. Id. However, the statutes
are likely per se unconstitutional because they ban abortions before the accepted point of
viability. See Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1225 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
905 (2014).
315. 159 CONG. REC. H3730-01 (daily ed. June 18, 2013).
316. See Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1225.
317. See Forte, supra note 10, at 138.
318. 159 CONG. REC. H3730–01 (daily ed. June 18, 2013).
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“whether Roe’s premises of fact have so far changed in the ensuing
[four] decades as to render its central holding somehow irrelevant or
unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed.”319 In Casey, the
Court answered this question in the negative because, although the
point of viability had changed in the two decades between Roe and Casey, such a change only went to “the scheme of time limits on the realization of competing interests.”320 However, when a fetus is deemed viable medical evidence indicates that the chances of survival outside the
womb are slim,321 leaving Roe’s central rule, marking viability as the
critical point, irrelevant. Further, new medical evidence has come to
light since the Court’s holdings in Roe and Casey showing unborn children can feel pain beginning at twenty weeks gestational age.322 This
new evidence renders Roe’s central rule unjustifiable.323 Thus, the critical point should be changed from viability to fetal pain as Roe’s central
rule is no longer relevant or justifiable in light of new medical evidence.
Viability is an irrelevant point in time at which to deem the State’s
interest in potential life compelling because the “realistic possibility” of
survival for children born at twenty-three and twenty-four weeks of
pregnancy, the generally accepted range at which viability occurs, in
fact reflects a fairly slim chance of survival.324 Because survival outside
the womb is unlikely at the point of viability, bans on abortions beginning at viability lack both “logical and biological justifications” as viability is less meaningful than many people believe.325 Although Justice
Blackmun held in Roe that the point of viability is the critical point at
which a State’s interest in potential life becomes compelling because at
that point there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a
life outside the womb, and thus state regulation after viability has both
“logical and biological justifications,”326 there is medical evidence suggesting that the chances of survival at twenty-three or twenty-four
weeks gestational age is slim. 327 Physicians estimate less than a 10%
chance of survival for children born at twenty-two weeks, a 10%–35%
chance of survival for children born at twenty-three weeks, and a 40%–
70% chance of survival for children born at twenty-four weeks gestational age.328 This evidence substantially undermines Justice
Blackmun’s reasoning for marking viability as the critical point. This is
so because there is not necessarily a realistic possibility of maintaining
and nourishing a life outside the womb for children born at the point of
319. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
320. Id. at 860.
321. Forte, supra note 10, at 138.
322. 159 CONG. REC. H3730–01 (daily ed. June 18, 2013).
323. See id.
324. See Forte, supra note 10, at 138.
325. See id. at 138–39.
326. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
327. See Forte, supra note 10, at 138.
328. Id.
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viability as evidenced by the statistics. Thus, there is no logical or biological justification for marking viability as the critical point because
viability is not a watershed point in time at which existence outside the
womb becomes probable rendering Roe’s central rule irrelevant.
Moreover, Roe’s central rule is unjustifiable in light of new medical
evidence showing unborn children are capable of feeling pain at twenty
weeks of pregnancy,329 a point in time prior to viability.330 When Roe
was decided in 1973, no medical evidence was available showing that
unborn children can feel pain beginning at twenty weeks gestational
age.331 Although such evidence had not come to light until recently, several Justices over the years have stated that the State would in fact
have an interest in intervening on behalf of the unborn child at the time
the child developed the capacity to feel pain if such medical evidence
ever came to light.332 In 1986, Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion
in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
argued that “the reason the Constitution forbids the state from restricting abortion is that the unborn child cannot feel pain.”333 He stated:
I should think it obvious that the State’s interest in the protection of an embryo – even if that interest is defined as “protecting
those who will be citizens,” - increases progressively and dramatically as the organism’s capacity to feel pain, to experience
pleasure, to survive, and to react to its surroundings increases
day by day. The development of a fetus, and pregnancy itself,
are not static conditions, and the assertion that the government’s interest is static simply ignores this reality.334
Although in 1986 “Justice Stevens assumed that the unborn would
not feel pain until late in pregnancy, [he] nonetheless . . . argued that
329. 159 CONG. REC. H3730–01 (daily ed. June 18, 2013).
330. Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1225 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
905 (2014).
331. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
778 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (discussing that if and when a fetus became capable of feeling pain the
State’s interest in protecting fetal life would be compelling); see also Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 552 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part with the judgment of the Court, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall) (concurring with Justice Stevens’s opinion in Thornburgh). Thus, if there was conclusive evidence showing that at a point in pregnancy a fetus became capable of feeling pain, Justice
Stevens and Justice Blackmun would have deemed the State’s interest compelling at that
time.
332. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring); Webster, 492 U.S. at
552 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part with the judgment of the Court,
joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall).
333. Forte, supra note 10, at 134 n.93.
334. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778 (emphasis added).
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the State has the progressive right to intervene as the unborn developed
the capacity to feel pain.”335 Further, in 1989, other Justices who supported a woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion including
Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun, the Justice
who authored Roe, all concurred with Justice Stevens’ 1986 assessment
that if and when a fetus developed the capacity to feel pain, the State
would have the right to intervene if it so chose. 336
Thus, now that medical evidence is available indicating that in fact
a fetus is capable of feeling pain beginning at twenty weeks gestational
age,337 Roe’s central rule, marking viability as the critical point at which
the State’s interest in potential life is compelling enough to ban abortions, is unjustifiable. This is the case because abortion procedures taking place between twenty weeks gestational age, the time at which a
fetus has the capacity to feel pain, and viability subject the unborn to a
painful demise.338 In light of this new medical evidence it seems several
Justices would concur that Roe’s central rule has become unjustifiable.
Thus, because Roe’s central holding has been rendered irrelevant
and unjustifiable in light of new medical evidence indicating that at viability there is not a realistic chance of survival outside the womb 339 and
that unborn child have the capacity to feel pain at twenty weeks of
pregnancy,340 the critical point should be changed to fetal pain. Replacing viability with fetal pain has both logical and biological justifications
because it would prevent unborn children from being subjected to painful abortion procedures; therefore, fetal pain is a relevant point in time
at which to deem the State’s interest in potential life compelling. Similarly, fetal pain is a justifiable point in time at which to hold the State’s
interest in fetal life compelling because intervention on behalf of the
unborn child at that point protects him or her from a painful end. Thus,
because Roe’s central rule is no longer relevant or justifiable and because a central rule holding fetal pain as the critical point would be both
relevant and justifiable, viability should be replaced with fetal pain as
the compelling point.
D. Conclusion
Fetal pain, not fetal viability, should be the critical point in time at
which the State’s interest in potential life is deemed compelling so as to
warrant prohibitions on abortions and thus the Supreme Court should
revisit Roe’s central rule. Under the test set out in Casey for revisiting
prior precedent,341 Roe’s central rule should be tweaked for four reasons.
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338.
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159 CONG. REC. H3730–01 (daily ed. June 18, 2013).
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First, viability is no longer a workable point in time at which to deem
the State’s interest compelling.342 Second, the central rule marking viability as the critical point could be tweaked without serious inequity to
those who rely on the right to abortion. 343 Third, under the Court’s expanded view of the State’s interest in fetal life, prohibiting State bans
on abortion beginning at twenty weeks gestational age, the time unborn
children become capable of feeling pain, is not logical. 344 Finally, in light
of new medical evidence, viability is an irrelevant and unjustifiable
point in time at which to deem the State’s interest compelling. 345 Thus,
the Supreme Court should revisit Roe’s central rule and replace it with
fetal pain, a more workable, logical, relevant, and justifiable point in
time at which to deem the State’s interest in potential life compelling.
PART V: CONCLUSION
“[V]iability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in
fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortion.”346 This central rule announced in Roe is in jeopardy in light of new medical evidence indicating that an unborn child
can feel pain at a point in time prior to viability. 347 Roe has always contained the seeds of its demise by relying on a state of medical
knowledge—rather than law, morality, or philosophy—that was bound
to change.348 The latest assault on Roe that is represented by these
twenty-week bans, which rely heavily on new medical knowledge,349
may very well succeed in diminishing Roe even further.
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